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Acronyms
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– Independent caches organized as a hierarchy (L1, L2, etc.) (L2 Cache)
– FPGAs use JTAG to provide access to their programming debug/emulation functions (JTAG)
Acronym Definition 
ASIC Application specific integrated circuit (ASIC)
BFMs Bus functional Models (BFMs)
BRAM Block random access memory (BRAM)
CLB Configurable Logic Block (CLB)
CM Configuration Management (CM)
CRCs Cyclic redundancy codes (CRCs)
DFR Design for Reliability (DFR)
DFT Design for Test (DFT)
DFV Design for Verification (DFV)
DSP Digital Signal Processing (DSP)
EDF Evolutionary Digital Filter (EDF)
EDIF Electronic Design Interchange Format (EDIF)
FPGA Field programmable gate array (FPGA)
GNL Gate Level Netlist (GLN)
GR Global Route (GR)
HDL Hardware Design Language (HDL)
I/O Input – output (I/O)
IP Intellectual Property (IP)
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
NEPP NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program
PR Place and Route (PR)
R Reliability (R)
SOC System on a chip (SOC)
SRAM Static random access memory (SRAM)
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High-Level Field Programmable Gate Array 
(FPGA) Design Flow: 
From The Manufacturer To System Insertion
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Manufacturer develops an 
FPGA Architecture
Mask is provided to 
Fabrication Foundry and 
the FPGA device is 
created
User group develops 
a circuit design (HDL)
User’s design is 
mapped into the 
FPGA’s internal gates
FPGA is configured 
with new design 
User organization 
procures FPGA devices
HDL: Hardware Design Language
Configured FPGA is 
inserted into system
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Scope of Presentation.
• This presentation focuses on reliability and trust 
for the user’s portion of the FPGA design flow. 
• It is assumed that FPGA internal components 
(configuration cells, routing, logic cells, hard 
intellectual property (IP), global routes, protection 
mechanisms, etc.) are tested by the manufacturer 
prior to hand-off to the user.
• The objective is to present the challenges of 
creating reliable and trusted designs.
– What makes a design vulnerable to functional flaws 
(reliability) or attackers (trust)?
– What are the challenges for verifying a reliable design 
versus a trusted design?
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FPGA Reliable Operation
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CLBs BRAM GR 
Control
Hard
IP
Configurable logic block: (CLB) 
Block random access memory: (BRAM)
Intellectual property: (IP); e.g., micro processors, digital signal processor blocks (DSP), etc,…
Global Routes: (GR)
Reliability: R
Reliable operation depends on a variety of parameters.
Complex 
routing logic 
everywhere.
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A Closer Look at The FPGA Design 
Process from The User’s Perspective
Synthesis
Place & 
Route (PR)
Create and Transfer Configuration to FPGA
Gate Level Netlist : 
(GLN or EDF or EDIF) Simulator
Board Level 
Verification
GLN+ PR+ Timing
Hardware Description Language 
(HDL) or Schematic
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Functional Design Development
• Both the design team and tool-set are expected to be 
reliable and trusted.
• Contractors are selected by a secure organization… but 
… the design team is selected by the contractor. 
– How well do you trust the members of the design team?  
– How many levels of contracting exist?
– Are the designers trained properly with pertinent design and 
verification experience?
– Are there protection mechanisms for possible inside attacks?
• Tools are selected by the design team.
– Are the tools from an accredited design organization?
– Is there a stipulation in the contract that the design team is 
required to use trusted tools?
• Is the contractor’s full design flow visible and are there 
the appropriate checks and balances in place 
(documentation and reviews)?
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Any weakness within your design flow: 
personnel, design methodology, 
design tools, verification process, and 
check & balances
… leaves an open door for an inside 
attack.
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We need to focus on the areas that are 
most vulnerable.
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Synthesis Tools
• User can select a synthesis tool from a trusted 3rd party (e.g., 
Synopsys) or from the FPGA’s manufacturer.
• It is the synthesis tool’s responsibility to:
– Interpret/analyze/optimize the user’s HDL, and
– select component cells from the FPGA device’s cell library to create 
the described hardware functionality. 
• Vulnerability: It is difficult to verify that the expected gate-level 
output matches the intended HDL.
• Bad synthesis output can be due to:
– Poor user written HDL,
– Mediocre synthesis tools, or
– Malicious synthesis tools.
• Vulnerability example: did the synthesis tool optimize away 
necessary logic?  Can you detect that the necessary logic does 
not exist?
• Best tool available for synthesis output verification: equivalence 
checking.  Doesn’t work for all trust cases.
9
To be presented by Melanie Berg at the Field Programmable Gate Array Symposium, Chantilly, VA, August 23, 2016.
Place and Route (PR) and Configuration 
Management (CM) Tools: Vulnerabilities
• Configuration contains all of the mapped place and 
route information.
• PR and CM from tools provided by the manufacturer. 
• Does the manufacturer have a trusted tool group?
– Offshore designers, Software IP, or University contributions. 
• Vulnerability Example (1): Objects can be “optimized” 
away (or erased) during PR or CM.
• Vulnerability Example (2): Configuration can be 
changed to disrupt function, timing, signal integrity, 
area, or power requirements.
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PR and CM Tools: Current Solutions
• PR and CM tools produced by major manufacturers are not highly 
vulnerable because of their widespread usage. Bugs or incorrect 
products are easier to detect.
• Functional verification is performed at the system level. 
– Can find many PR and CM bugs at the system level. 
– Challenge: it can be difficult to find corner case bugs.
• Tools are available to perform a form of equivalence checking and 
formal verification to help verify that all logic exists. 
– It is important to note that the tools are limited in their success.
– Challenges: size of circuit and redundancy.
• Cyclic redundancy codes (CRCs) and Keys are used to identify 
unique configurations.
– They are usually checked in design reviews.
– Challenge: Due to last minute design changes, it is rare that the 
last configuration downloaded to the FPGA has been reviewed 
(lack of check and balances).
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Design Methodology and Reliable 
Operation Considerations
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Metastability
Number of Clock 
Domains Clock Balancing
Reset Structure
Power (Hot-spots)
Area
I/O Standard 
Selection
I/O Rings and 
Pin Switching 
(ground-bounce)
Long Traces 
(charge sharing) Creation of 
Latches versus 
Edge-triggered 
flip-flops
These concerns are FPGA/ASIC hardware design specific.  
They are not Software and Firmware design concerns.
Static Timing 
Analysis … 
Setup/hold time 
violations (race 
conditions)
Synthesis tool 
interpretation of HDL
HDL: hardware description language
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Vulnerabilities when Assuming FPGA 
is Software or Firmware
• Reliability: If a design is not managed as a hardware 
solution (i.e., if a design is managed as a software or 
firmware product), then reliability will be 
compromised.
• Trust:
– Overlooked hardware considerations will leave vulnerabilities 
for attackers.
– In other words, if an attacker knows a design team is not 
following proper design techniques, bugs can be easily 
inserted.
• Reliability and trust: A strong verification process 
might be able to find most bugs.  However, with highly 
complex designs, verification (as performed in the 
FPGA design world) is not always sufficient.
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Difference between Reliability and 
Trust
• Types of functional reliability failures are fairly well 
known:
– Bad design practices: lack of training, asynchronous design, 
signal integrity, incorrect clock domain crossings, 
metastability, set-up time violations, race conditions, 
incorrect logic implementation, ambiguous documentation.
– Bad verification practices.
– Misinterpreting FPGA internal components.
– Misinterpreting HDL versus software or firmware.
• Types of trust failures are not as well known because 
there’s always an attacker searching for 
vulnerabilities.
• It’s difficult to tell the difference between bad design 
practice and malicious intent.
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Why is Reliable Design Practice 
Important with Regards to Trust
• Attackers will try to take advantage of 
vulnerabilities. 
• Bad design is a vulnerability.
• Due to the complexity of modern day designs it is 
difficult to find bugs in a design.  
– Limitations in verification exist.
– Designs are becoming extremely complex.
– Insertion of 3rd party IP cores reduce visibility and control.
• It is substantially more difficult to find a bug that is 
meant to be hidden.
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Inserting malware has become much easier; because the 
exponential growth in design state space makes it almost 
impossible to find/identify malware.
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Confronting the Verification Challenge
• The problem boils down to state space exploration … 
it’s just too large of a problem to tackle.
• Simulation and emulation are not sufficient… too 
difficult to traverse enough of a design’s state space. 
• In the ASIC world, rules were created:
– Design for test (DFT).
– Design for Verification (DFV).
– Design for Reliability (DFR).
• In the ASIC world, DFT and DFV rules have been 
incorporated in library cells.
• In most cases DFR is used in FPGA design 
methodology.
• Most DFT and DFV rules are not used in FPGA designs 
because they take up too much area and compromise 
performance.
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Example of A Common Design Bug
17
Trigger upon 
event
Wait for 1 
million sub-
events
Respond
Bit 19
Bit 18
Bit 17
Bit 16
Bit 15
Bit 14
Bit 13
Bit 12
Bit 11
Bit 10
Bit 9
Bit 8
Bit 7
Bit 6
Bit 5
Bit 4
Bit 3
Bit 2
Bit 1
Bit 0
Should create a 
counter with 20 bits 
(flip-flops) 
2^20=1,048,576
What happens if Bit 19 
gets optimized away by 
synthesis?
Counter will 
never count to 
1 million and 
the response 
will never 
occur!!!!!!
Might be difficult to simulate 1 million sub events.
ASIC Solution (DFV) : test mode enables the counter to be 
loaded with any number to reduce simulation time.
Generally not done with FPGA designs! Vulnerability!!!!!!!!!
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Common Mitigation Challenges
• Circuits might need mitigation:
– Space environment or
– Man-made radiation.
• If required, for FPGA’s that do not include embedded 
mitigation, the user inserts mitigation into the design.
• Challenges:
– Many users aren’t aware of the proper mitigation strategy 
required by the target FPGA.
– Tools are not efficient for modern FPGAs.
– If not implemented correctly, mitigation can be optimized away.
– IP cores are complicating the insertion process (can’t insert 
mitigation to the inside of many of the IP cores).
– Currently, there is no way to verify that the correct mitigation 
strategy was implemented . 
• Repercussion: A circuit that is expected to be mitigated, but 
not mitigated correctly, will not have the proper protection 
and will malfunction in its target environment.
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Reducing Vulnerability: DFT, DFV, and DFR (1)
• Enhancing the design process:
– Create unambiguous documentation.
– Follow strict synchronous design rules.
– Plan global routing control for less internal noise.
– Carefully select and analyze I/O for less interface noise and 
power.
– Create reusability rules.
– Abide by a configuration management process.
– Implementation of assertion based HDL.
• ASIC specific:
– Include additional logic into the flip-flops to implement test 
mode control (scan-rings).
• Increases control and visibility of internal logic for bug detection 
and verification.
• Increases logic area because flip-flops have more logic and 
routing is more complex (test versus normal mode of operation).
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Reducing Vulnerability: DFT, DFV, and DFR (2)
• Improving the simulation process:
– Implementation of assertion based HDL.
– Forcing events or states.
– Performing a mixture of random and structured tests.
– Usage of bus functional models (BFMs).
• Improving tool usage:
– Equivalence checking.
– Area and power prediction. Area and power control (floor-
planning).
– Static timing analysis and statistical timing analysis.
– Lint checking.
– Formal Verification.
– Clock domain crossing checks.
• Design Reviews (beginning, middle, and end of design 
cycle).
• Separate the design team and verification team.
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Conclusions
• Following reliable design techniques helps to reduce functional 
bugs and trust vulnerabilities.
• The key is to avoid malfunction.  
• We cannot stop designers from creating bugs and may not be able 
to avoid attacks:
– Verification (simulation, emulation, formal methods, and reviews) are necessary 
to reduce the probability of malfunction.
– Checking tools should be used to validate tool output.
– Protection mechanisms should be put into place regarding design team 
participation. 
• FPGAs are now SOCs.  Design complexity has made verification a 
challenging task.
– ASIC verification method(DFT, DFV, and formal methods) may need to be 
considered to assist in the verification flow.
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